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Jeffrey Kahn* 
Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel? 
Polonius: By the mass, and 'tis like a camel, indeed. 
Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel. 
Polonius: It is backed like a weasel. 
Hamlet: Or like a whale? 
Polonius: Very like a whale. 
-- Hamlet, act 3, sc. 2 
I. INTRODUCTION
A metaphor claims that one thing is actually another.  “The past is another 
country;” L.P. Hartley wrote, “they do things differently there.”1  Exercising more 
humility, a simile suggests that one thing is merely like another.  Lord Byron 
famously described an Assyrian attack on biblical Jerusalem in a poem stuffed 
with simile.  Its opening stanza paints a rich image: 
The Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold, 
And his cohorts were gleaming in purple and gold; 
And the sheen of their spears was like stars on the sea, 
When the blue wave rolls nightly on deep Galilee.2   
Like a wolf on the fold.  Nice.  You can just picture it, can’t you?     
Not everyone is enamored of these figures of speech.  “One thing that 
literature would be greatly the better for,” Ogden Nash humorously rhymed, 
citing Byron’s poem as evidence, “Would be a more restricted employment by the 
authors of simile and metaphor.”3  Beautiful turns of phrase sometimes convey 
more than might be there, or disguise what is.  Byron’s description neatly 
distributes guilt and innocence at the same time that it suggests a surprise attack 
(which, according to Byron’s source of inspiration, did not go so well for the 
Assyrians, and might not even have been that much of a surprise).4  Precision may 
be sacrificed to impose a normative point on ambiguous facts and unsuspecting 
audiences.  Sometimes the past is not another country.  Maybe the Assyrians 
weren’t so tough after all (or the rulers and inhabitants of Jerusalem so worthy of 
divine protection).5   
Nash’s jeremiad against the poets wasn’t the first or the last of its kind.  
Raymond Chandler expanded the list of culprits beyond poets: “Goddamn silly 
simile. Writers. Everything has to be like something else.”6  Add lawyers and 
judges to that list.  These writers, at least in common-law systems, are very fond 
of metaphor and simile, which goes by the professional name of analogical 
reasoning.   
Generally speaking, when lawyers analogize they lack the ring of a Lord 
Byron.  But one thing must necessarily be like enough to another for a common 
law system of precedent to function.  Distinguishing cases, applying previous 
holdings to new facts, extrapolating from seemingly conflicting positions, all this 
requires a healthy power of comparison, and sometimes, imagination.  It also 
requires self-reflection about the limits a judicial office imposes on that creativity. 
While a judge is expected to exercise judgment (the identical roots of these words 
say so), the task is constrained by factors the judge is not supposed to alter.  
“Law” is the heading under which that constraint is known, but disagreement 
about what is included under it makes law an eternally contested concept.   
Metaphorically speaking, these analogical devices are all arrows in the legal 
writer’s quiver of arguments.  The hope is that these arrows will pierce through 
doubts or confusion to persuade the reader that the writer’s legal point is correct.  
But this essay discusses a fear, not a hope, about analogical reasoning.  
Sometimes analogical reasoning portrays a subjective choice as an inevitable legal 
conclusion.  Like the traveler in a forest who discovers tree after tree of perfect 
bull’s-eyes, this impression is misleading.  When asked, the boy who shot the 
arrows explains his method: “first I shoot at a tree.  Then I draw a target around 
the arrow.”7    
Justice Cardozo warned that: “Metaphors in law are to be narrowly 
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving 
it.”8  A cottage industry has emerged to study the phenomenon, picking out good 
from bad.9  Steven Winter, who relates the story of the boy painting targets 
around his arrows, rejects as mistaken the fear of subjectivity-run-amok that the 
story suggests.  But even Winter acknowledges that this fear “seems yet more 
compelling when the narrator is a powerful official like a judge, backed by the 
might and authority of the state.  If law is fused with narrative, then it seems to 
face precisely the problem of subjectivity that it strives so hard to avoid.”10  
After all, when law and analogy mix, the concoction can be quite 
dangerous.  Many legal systems have strictly forbidden its application in their 
criminal law, or guarded against it with rules of lenity and other restrictions on 
statutory interpretation.  Well known are the abuses of Soviet crime-by-analogy, a 
conversion technique adopted as socialist legal theorists and their more brutal 
revolutionary leaders sought to replace an imperial Russian law that obstinately 
refused to wither away (a neat Marxist metaphor).  Thus, a criminal code enacted 
not long after the Bolshevik Revolution rejected the concept of nulla poene sine 
lege: “If any socially dangerous act has not been directly provided for by the 
present Code, the basis and extent of liability for it is determined by applying to it 
those articles of the code which deal with the offences most similar in nature.”11   
In a society purporting to be governed by law, few things could threaten 
the individual’s freedom more than a court’s power to determine that a crime had 
been committed not because the statute books defined one, but because the 
defendant’s act came close enough.  Eventually, such analogical reasoning is no 
longer needed to disguise what is really going on.  In due time, the Third Reich 
adopted this doctrine of analogy; the words of Nazi Minister of Justice Otto 
Thierack chill the blood: “Every judge is at liberty to call on me in case he thinks 
that a law compels him to render a judgment not compatible with real life.  In 
such an emergency it will be my task to provide him with the law he needs.”12   
The danger inherent in all of this comes down to lack of certainty.  It is not 
possible to know with certainty which acts are permitted and which are forbidden 
when analogy can blur the division between them.  It is unsurprising, then, that 
political crimes – treason and heresy being two good examples found in early 
English law -- tend to possess less certainty (in their elements, their definition, 




quiet, he would make him heir of the crown,” was condemned to death for 
treason.14  The statute defined as treason “when a man doth compass or imagine 
the death of our Lord the King.”15  Though Hale called Walker’s fate a “very 
hard” judgment of treason, a legal mind could imagine that Walker had imagined 
the death of Edward IV.   
 The statute required the judge in Walker’s case to reason by analogy in 
order to convict him.  Imagining the king’s death in an attempt to soothe a child 
was like enough to a plotter’s meeting to work political revolution.  The problem, 
of course, is who’s to say?  Today we find it easy to reject this analogy – the two 
are quite different.  But why?  Is it because Walker lacks the intent of a plotter?  
Lacks the means to realize his uttered thoughts? The motive?  What is missing is 
not provided by the statute; it must be creatively supplied by the judge, whose 
“freedom from political pressure varies inversely, to some extent, with his 
freedom to create the rules which he will enforce.”16  That is why the definition of 
treason in Article III of the U.S. Constitution is perceived rightly to be an 
important liberty-protecting clause, for it specifies the crime in a way that makes 
reasoning by analogy difficult.   
 Fascists are easy fishing, as are Bolsheviks and British kings.  Those born 
to freedom, Justice Brandeis asserted, “are naturally alert to repel invasion of their 
liberty by evil-minded rulers.”17  Analogical reasoning does not always come 
down like a wolf on the fold.  In our twenty-first century, post-9/11 America, 
there are subtler opportunities for reasoning by analogy, although the pressure 
encouraging analogy remains essentially as it has been throughout history.  It is 
the desire for flexibility (itself a metaphoric description, for it conjures law as 
something rigid or bendable, and why should that be?).  When the world seems to 
be fast changing, or the dangers new and especially frightening, or one’s enemies 
encircling, the certainty of law seems less urgently desirable.  This is a perennial 
and universal temptation, and therefore warrants our consideration: 
The use of analogy in itself is not necessary to a 
tyrannical State, nor does its presence necessarily 
indicate the existence of such a State, but it does 
appear to be a symptom of that type of government 
which places the protection of the State from the 
risk of disorder above the protection of the 
individual from the risk of oppression.18 
Or, as Justice Brandeis asserted: “Experience should teach us to be most on our 
guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born 
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded 
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”19 
 In this essay, I examine three dangers present in the relationship that 
analogy maintains with law.  The first two concern the risks inherent in 
(wittingly) comparing one technology to another and in comparing (often 
unwittingly) one era or social context to another.  The third manifests when we 
fail to appreciate the unintended long-term consequences of analogies and 




 In an era of “rule-of-law reform,” when American lawyers and legal 
scholars seem eager to transplant the fruits of our legal system onto foreign soils 
(to borrow Alan Watson’s famous metaphor), it is worth noting some hazards 
lurking in our own tradition of analogical thinking.  Perhaps we aren’t as 
equipped to engage in the rule-of-law export business as we tend to believe.20  
Relatedly, our experience climbing out of the “legal black hole” of Guantánamo  
Bay suggests not only problems of export, but the potential value of importing a 
bit more of what was once called “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”   
II.  First, A Caveat 
 A word of caution about this essay’s objective is warranted.  There is no 
point to launching a facial attack on the use of analogy, and this essay should not 
be misinterpreted as such a blunt and blundering effort.  The fact of the matter is 
that analogical reasoning is inescapable (in law as in life).  In the words of Steven 
Winter, “human thought is irreducibly imaginative.”21  Winter’s rejection of the 
fear of analogical reasoning as subjectivity-run-amok has already been noted.  He 
and others reject that fear as based on mistaken understandings of human 
cognition.  As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have written, metaphorical 
concepts “structure (at least in part) what we do and how we understand what we 
are doing.”22   
 These scholars persuasively argue that this recursive feature means that it 
is empirically wrong to hold that “metaphor is only about the ways we talk and 
not about conceptualization and reasoning.”23  For that reason and others steeped 
in cognitive theory, Winter rejects the anxiety that “metaphor is merely a matter 
of expression – useful for rhetorical purposes, but perilous to reason.”24  In fact, 
he argues, since our sense of rationality is related to our common, embodied 
experience of the world around us, the human tendency to categorize, analogize, 
or employ metaphors or other devices is not imaginative freedom unconstrained: 
it operates “in a regular, orderly, and systematic fashion.”25 
 This essay does not seek to participate in the sophisticated scholarly 
debate about mind that Winter, Lakoff, Johnson and others have advanced.  The 
philosophical, scientific, and legal circles in which these discussions have taken 
place are broad and deep, examining questions of the human condition and social 
structure that seem timeless.  But they are not examined here.  Nor do I seek to 
chronicle examples of the use of metaphor in legal writing.26  My purpose is 
found in between these contributions.  Even if human thought is more than 
analytic logic (which seems an easy concession to make, at least for someone not 
engaged in debates and experimentation about the nature of human thought), the 
use of metaphor can still present pitfalls, even if reasoning by analogy can be a 
“quite effective and efficient” mode of thought.27   
 That is the substance of this essay.  We may think in metaphoric ways, and 
conceptual metaphors may well “characterize patterns of semantic productivity 
and everyday reasoning.”28  But not every use of metaphor may be conceptual, or 
based on embodied experience.  Indeed, some may just be convenient, used to 
avoid articulating well-grounded reasons, or to persuade while remaining 
ambiguous about multiple possible reasons.  This is an essay about those bad 




III.  Dangers of Metaphor: Technology 
 Consider, first, the dangers of adopting a precedent from one side of a 
technological divide for use on the other.  Just such a problem confronted the 
Supreme Court during its October 2013 term.  The Court granted a petition for 
certiorari to decide the question whether the admission at trial of evidence 
obtained from a search of David Riley’s cell phone following a traffic stop 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  In an opinion handed down in the last days of 
the term, the Court held that a warrant was required to search for such digital 
information, even incident to an otherwise valid arrest (sometimes an exception to 
the warrant requirement).29   
 The case boiled down to analogies and metaphors.  Since the Court made 
clear (metaphorically) that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness,” one might well ask how it could not.30  To decipher what was 
reasonable, the Court wandered through its past decisions looking for analogous 
cases.  Was a cell phone like a crumpled cigarette package, which if searched 
incident to arrest would reveal drugs hidden inside?31  Or was searching the cell 
phone more like opening a 200-pound, locked footlocker in the trunk of a car?32  
Or more like an item within reaching distance of the arrested driver of a car, 
especially when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest might be found in the vehicle”?33 
 What made the case cert-worthy was that cell phone technology, “nearly 
inconceivable just a few decades ago,” had become “such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude 
they were an important feature of human anatomy.”34  Indeed, the analogy to “a 
container whose contents may be searched incident to an arrest” seemed “a bit 
strained as an initial matter” and “crumbles entirely” in the face of cloud 
computing (boy, what a metaphor there!).35  The phone is more a device to 
display what is in distant clouds of data than a container holding data inside it.  
Weighed on metaphoric scales against two grounds for exceptions to the warrant 
requirement on one scale (protecting officer safety and preventing the destruction 
of evidence), the Court found the protection of privacy the greater good weighing 
down the other side of the scale.  But why was this the right choice between 
individual privacy and “the promotion of legitimate governmental interests,” 
which the Court took as the appropriate metric?36 
 The array of analogies didn’t answer this question; it just described ways 
of seeing the problem, rejecting each one.  The Court, having rejected the 
container analogy, fought simile with simile: “The United States asserts that a 
search of all data stored on a cell phone is ‘materially indistinguishable’ from 
these sorts of physical items [viz. a billfold, address book, wallet, or purse].  That 
is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to 
the moon.”37  So, the Court concluded, cell phones were different: “Prior to the 
digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal 
information with them as they went about their day.  Now it is the person who is 
not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception.”38 
 It is unclear at best whether the opposing analogies in the Supreme Court’s 




differently than physical containers.  A cell phone is neither a container nor a 
window display nor anything other than a cell phone.  But putting these images in 
the mind of the reader obscured the Court’s ambiguity about what its holding was 
actually based upon.  Was the empirical claim of ubiquity of cell phone 
possession and everyday use essential for the holding?  Or was it the unique 
capacity of such small devices to hold such enormous volumes of information (or 
to provide access -- in the Court’s evocative simile, like “a key in a suspect's 
pocket” -- to a larger trove located elsewhere)?39  Was it the relative speed of a 
physical search (versus accessing and downloading digital information) that 
tipped the balance?  How much weight to give the principle that privacy requires 
such protection even if evidence of a crime goes undetected, or officer safety is 
threatened as a result?  Is it true that digital data never poses the risks that 
unknown physical objects might?   
 A good analogy might have persuasive impact on the reader, just as 
repeatedly contrasting a modern cell phone to a crumpled cigarette package 
emphasized the Court’s rejection of the container analogy.  But was the legal 
conclusion – a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest is unreasonable 
– the cause or the effect of dismissing the container analogy?  And if we cannot 
answer, what does one say to the court – in our own country or another – that 
finds a cell phone to be very like a container?  Or an address book?  Or like 
enough in some indeterminate number of points of comparison? 
 Rapid technological change need not always present a problem of 
ambigious analogical reasoning.  The Riley Court’s approach was different than 
the analogical reasoning Oliver Wendell Holmes famously employed when he 
interpreted the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919.40  The issue was 
whether an airplane was a “vehicle” under the terms of the statute.  Holmes 
handed down his three-paragraph opinion in 1931.  He concluded that the 
statute’s prohibition of interstate transport of automobiles or “any other self-
propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails” did not include self-propelled 
vehicles that flew through the air, even though airplanes were still quite new but 
also “well known in 1919.”41  This was for two reasons.  First, “in everyday 
speech ‘vehicle’ calls up the picture of a thing moving on land.”  Second, that was 
the best interpretation, he reasoned, because “[a]lthough it is not likely that a 
criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it 
is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the 
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is 
passed.”42   
 Holmes evaluated an analogical question – Are automobiles sufficiently 
like airplanes? – and provided precisely articulated reasons for answering “no”.  
He relied on common usage of a term in the statute and a principle about fairness 
in the criminal law.  Whether he was right about either the empirical question or 
the value question is debatable.  But it is clear what the reasons behind the 
analogical part of the decision are.  We know why the analogy was rejected by 
Holmes. 
 But why did the Supreme Court pick and choose among the analogies it 




that searching wallets and address books was analogous to searching cell phones.  
The Court dismissed the analogy with one of its own: although a horse and a lunar 
lander are both “ways of getting from point A to point B, [] little else justifies 
lumping them together.”43   
 But precisely why (in other words, which future social or technological 
changes to cell phones won’t matter) is unclear.  The Court recognized this 
difficulty in rejecting a solution proposed by the Government: “Is an e-mail 
equivalent to a letter? Is a voicemail equivalent to a phone message slip? It is not 
clear how officers could make these kinds of decisions before conducting a 
search, or how courts would apply the proposed rule after the fact.”44 The opinion 
thus held that the “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement 
did not apply to cell phones, but left open the possibility that another exception – 
for example, the “exigent circumstances” exception – might apply instead.45  All 
well and good.  But how did we get there and what role did (or will) all those 
analogies play? 
IV.  Dangers of Metaphor: Context 
 Liberty preserved by analogy risks destruction by analogy, too.  The 
Government has had much more success glossing over the effects of such 
technological changes on our society in lawsuits about the right to travel.  Digital 
terrorist watchlists (such as the No Fly List) have enabled a new power to take 
restrict freedom of movement.  The state now monitors all commercial air travel 
and can deny access to any flight in U.S. airspace.  Defending such programs, 
attorneys for the United States have relied on judicial precedents that consider air 
travel just “one mode of transportation” interchangeable with others.  Prohibiting 
air travel works no injury to any legally cognizable right, the argument goes, 
because other modes of transportation remain unrestricted.   
 These precedents, however, fall on the distant side of a technological 
divide, dating to an era when air travel was the rare and glamorous realm of the 
elite.   That is a world that no longer exists (“the past is another country”).46  
Airplanes have become the greyhound buses of the twenty-first century, with 
more people boarding them each day than the entire population of the city of 
Philadelphia – in fact, nearly two hundred thousand people more.47  Nevertheless, 
the Justice Department has routinely submitted affidavits from its paralegals 
noting the availability of ocean freighters in lieu of trans-Atlantic aircraft 
(although without mentioning the existence of a maritime watchlist, too) and 
finding ground transportation an equivalent substitute for aviation.48  Is a car 
similar enough to a plane in the twenty-first century to accommodate such 
asserted equivalence?  Regardless, is it the analogy that gets us to that conclusion, 
or the conclusion that makes the analogy resonate?    
 Ironically, while the Government has argued that air travel is analogous to 
other modes of transportation in order to defeat the argument that the No Fly List 
infringes any constitutional right to travel, Justice Department lawyers have been 
quite critical of analogies presented by plaintiffs arguing for more procedural 
rights to contest their inclusion on such lists.  In the most hotly contested of the 




Primarily through analogies to cases in inapposite 
contexts, Plaintiffs demand a wide range of 
procedures and disclosures of information, none of 
which are called for by the requirements of due 
process in this setting, and all of which would 
significantly threaten the very national security 
interests the No Fly List is designed to protect.  The 
kind of procedures Plaintiffs demand, including 
(among other things) adversarial hearings and 
access to witnesses and all information pertinent to 
a No Fly List determination (including classified 
national security and privileged law enforcement 
information), are not applicable to No Fly List 
determinations and, indeed, disregard well-founded 
protections for the kind of national security 
information needed maintain the No Fly List.49 
 Why?  What made the plaintiffs comparisons such “inapposite” analogies?  
The parties fought about such abstract issues as whether a deprivation of property 
was more severe than a deprivation of liberty.  The Government claimed property 
losses were more serious, citing cases in which the State Department successfully 
defended the power to designate certain entities as terrorist organizations and the 
Department of the Treasury then froze their assets.50  But this was only because 
the procedures accorded to those who fought such designations and asset freezes 
were less onerous than those the plaintiffs sought in the ongoing No Fly List 
litigation and, in particular, did not require the Government to release of classified 
information.51  
 In a section of the Government’s brief devoted to opposing the plaintiffs’ 
analogies (indeed titled “Plaintiffs’ Analogies To The Process Due In Plainly 
Distinct Settings Are Misplaced”) rejected comparison between procedures in 
detention and criminal cases, deportation cases, and property disputes with 
procedures the plaintiffs desired to contest No Fly List designations.  These 
contexts were “unrelated,” the Government argued, criticizing the plaintiffs for 
failing to rely only on cases “arising in the national security context.”52  
(Ironically, a few pages earlier, and without explanation, the Government invited 
the Court to “compare” the liberty interests in “avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs” and “not being confined unnecessarily” 
with “the ability to travel by airplane … only a limited aspect of an individual’s 
liberty interest in international travel,” although neither case cited arose in a 
national security context, or even a context less than twenty-five years old.53  
Inapposite or helpful?)   Opposition was on the grounds that the liberty 
deprivation involved in those cases was more severe and therefore the greater 
protections accorded to those injured were “not reasonably applicable” to the No 
Fly List context.54  
 It is unsurprising that such arguments should be made in a memorandum 
of law supporting a motion (in this case, for summary judgment).  What is 




analogous” takes its place.  But the whole point of the common law enterprise is 
to explain, reason, justify, and persuade readers of briefs and judicial opinions 
that one thing is sufficiently like, or unlike, another to warrant similar or different 
treatment.  Why should the degree of injury or the nature of the context matter?  
That is the crucial point.  But it is given short shrift, the lawyers merely noting the 
difference but not explaining its significance.  Indeed, when the holding of a case 
involving cancellation of a USDA “grazing permit” suited the Government’s 
purpose, there was no apparent hesitation (or even embarrassment) in citing to 
this case involving a degree of injury outside of the context of national security 
that was simply not “analogous” to the issues before the court.55   
 These No Fly List cases reveal a problem with analogical reasoning that 
manifests itself not in a gloss between different technologies but in ignoring 
essential contexts.  As background, consider that the No Fly List is one of several 
terrorist watchlists, all drawn from a centralized terrorist screening database, 
created and administered by a post-9/11 organization housed in the FBI.  The No 
Fly List is then sent to the Transportation Security Administration, which uses it 
to vet the travel of anyone who wishes to fly in U.S. airspace.   
 What should the standard of review be for adding a name to the terrorist 
screening database, or the more refined No Fly List?  Set the standard too high 
and the watchlist may omit the names of people who would cause harm. Set it too 
low, and the false positives accumulate.  The standard selected is called the 
“reasonable suspicion” test, which is met if “based on the totality of the 
circumstances, … articulable intelligence or information … taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants a determination that” the 
criteria for placement on a watchlist such as the No Fly List has been met.56 
 If this standard of review sounds familiar, that is because it is virtually 
identical to the reasonable suspicion standard created by the Supreme Court in 
Terry v. Ohio, a 1968 case with racial overtones about a policeman who wanted to 
stop people he thought might be casing a jewelry store.57 That case upheld the 
power of police to briefly detain, question, and frisk an individual on grounds less 
than probable cause, which all agreed that the policeman lacked. All that was 
needed, the Court held, was a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts 
found in the totality of the circumstances. 
 The multi-agency government working group that devised this standard 
was well aware that the Terry case involved law enforcement officials in a 
criminal investigative context. In fact, concern was expressed about applying the 
standard in the intelligence context. They avoided even using the case label.58  
But it was their only case, their only precedent cited for the standard they wished 
to adopt.  The working group assured itself that Terry v. Ohio should only be the 
starting point of its thinking about the case. 
 This was magical thinking.  Perhaps the working group did not want to say 
that watchlisting is analogous to a police stop, but that is what they did.  The 
contexts must be “close enough” for the test to have legal legitimacy in its new 
use.  The reasonable suspicion standard was devised for a particular context in 
which it, arguably, made some sense. The Court was concerned with officer 




concerned not to displace probable cause -- hence time limits placed on the stop 
itself. And there was always the reassuring thought that if the Terry stop 
developed into an arrest, there was a neutral magistrate on the other end to whom 
the facts of detention and arrest and charge would soon be brought for resolution. 
 None of that, of course, is part of the watchlist process, which the 
Government has sought to insulate from judicial review. Physical safety on its 
own does not justify such a low standard. There is no implicit time limit to 
watchlisting decisions. And until very recently no one had successfully accessed a 
neutral magistrate to evaluate the watchlisting decision in the first place, let alone 
routinized review procedures of the criminal justice system.  And yet, the standard 
remains, protected by the sticky power of precedent stripped of context and 
adopted by implicit analogy.   
V.  The View from Guantánamo Bay 
 The first draft of this essay was completed while the author served as an 
observer at a military commission held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  In our day, 
this place has produced the worst metaphoric criticism of the United States’s 
commitment to the rule of law: Guantánamo Bay was, and for some remains, a 
“legal black hole.”59  Its very selection as the place to interrogate and detain 
prisoners seized in what was then called the “war on terror” was intended to 
isolate it from U.S. law.  A military order issued by President George W. Bush 
directed that military commissions be created to try certain non-U.S. citizens 
“with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing” were members of 
al Qaida or committed, attempted to commit, or supported acts of terrorism or acts 
that intend “injury to or adverse effects on the U.S., its citizens, national security, 
foreign policy, or economy.”60 
 The Supreme Court thwarted that intention, extending access to judicial 
review of detention on the theory that non-U.S. citizens were eligible to petition 
for writs of habeas corpus because held under the “complete jurisdiction and 
control” of the United States.61  The Court also undid the system of military 
commissions established by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in response to 
President Bush’s military order.62  That original system was created ad hoc 
instead of adopting existing principles and rules of law that already operated 
either in the United States District Courts or in the courts-martial established by 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  The Military Commissions Act of 2006 
was similarly struck down by the Court as working an unconstitutional suspension 
of habeas corpus.63  Only with the Military Commissions Act of 2009 could a 
new system begin to operate in earnest.   
 From a high of nearly 800 individuals detained at Guantánamo, 122 
detainees remained there at the start of 2015.64  However, this is due more to 
release for other reasons than the workings of any military commission. The 
military commission system has resulted in only three detainees either serving 
sentences or in the process of being sentenced; only seven more detainees are 
actively being prosecuted by military commission.65 The guilty plea of one of the 
first detainees, Australian David Hicks (one of the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush), 
was recently set aside for the same reason that the guilty verdict of another tried 




support to terrorism) was held to be unlawful and therefore vacated: “it was a 
plain ex post facto violation.”66  Ongoing military commissions have proceeded at 
a snail’s pace because of the aggressive legal defense of appointed counsel.  In the 
case that I observed, the docket extended (at that time) to 172 pages of pre-trial 
motions and arguments and rulings.  Years and years must pass at this rate if the 
commission will ever reach the merits stage.67  And then come the appeals. 
 Ironically, therefore, “legal black hole” may be the least accurate metaphor to 
describe the Guantánamo  military commissions that presently operate.  As the 
Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for policy noted to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in response to hostile questions:  “Lawyers are litigating to 
death every new issue and these cases are dragging on for quite some time.”68  By 
comparison, “in the civilian court system, because of the speedy trial and the 
efficiency of our courts, we are getting convictions and putting these people in 
prison fairly quickly.”69   
 How odd it seems, and yet so very heartening, that a core principle of the 
rule of law – justice for all – seems to be at the source of these Supreme Court 
opinions and of the lawyers’ diligence in representing the accused.  At the same 
time, how very bittersweet (if not simply bitter) the thought that the United States 
required more than a decade to re-accept this essential concept, and that the 
American public (as well as the officials and politicians who govern in their 
name) remain ambivalent at best, and more often at odds, about the continued 
utility of the Guantánamo  system.  
 The effects on other countries of this malingering attitude of the United 
States are far-reaching and unpredictable.  Upon hearing that an American court 
had thrown out the conviction of David Hicks, the “Australian Taliban” as a 
“plain ex post facto violation,” Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott felt 
disinclined to see a vindication for the rule of law: “We did what was needed.  
Let’s not forget … he was up to no good on his own admission.”70  Contrast that 
dismissive attitude toward legal constraints with a comment that very same day by 
the Polish Foreign Minister, who was asked his reaction to a court order to pay 
more than a quarter of a million dollars in damages to Guantánamo Bay detainees 
tortured at a CIA black site in Poland.  “We have to do it,” Grzegorz Schetyna 
said, “because we are a country that abides laws.”71  The legal black hole may be 
less than it was, but when will the effects of its gravity no longer be felt?  And 
how striking to hear remarks so much more respectful of the power of law from 
an official from a newly emerged democratic country than from the leader of an 
“established” Western democracy. 
 On the same day that President Bush ordered the creation of these military 
commissions, he hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin at the White House.  
Their joint statement began by noting that “Our countries are embarked on a new 
relationship for the 21st century, founded on a commitment to the values of 
democracy, the free market, and the rule of law.”72  Given Mr. Putin’s subsequent 
track record, this statement proved as improvident as President Bush’s earlier 
reflections about the Russian president’s soul.73  One wonders what influence the 




leader’s perceptions of the boundaries of permissible action in regard to his 
country’s legal commitments to its citizens and in its efforts to fight its own wars. 
Russia’s track record is one that treats law as an instrument of power.  A Russian 
proverb speaks volumes about this life for much of the Russian experience: “The 
law is like the shaft of a wagon – it goes wherever you turn it.”74  As Stalin’s 
Commissar of Justice, Nikolai Krylenko, put it, metaphorically: 
The court is, and still remains, the only thing it can 
be by its nature as an organ of the government 
power – a weapon for the safeguarding of the 
interests of a given ruling class … A club is a 
primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the 
most efficient is the court … For us there is no 
difference between a court of law and summary 
justice. … The court is an organ of state 
administration and as such does not differ in its 
nature from any other organs of administration 
which are designed, as the court is, to carry out one 
and the same governmental policy …75 
These metaphors matter, for they affect the way lawmakers, political leaders, 
bureaucrats, and private citizens think about legal problems.  When law is a 
weapon or a tool, as it remains conceived in Russia today, it has only instrumental 
value, a means of empowerment of one group over others instead of a framework 
for institutions and processes of value to all.76   
 The Russian liberal Alexander Herzen bemoaned his countrymen’s 
willingness to violate the law, noting his government’s equally dismissive 
attitude.  “Complete inequality before the court nipped his respect for lawfulness 
in the bud.  The Russian, whatever his social status, subverts or violates the law 
wherever he can do so without being punished, and the government acts in just 
the same way.”77  Which begets which?  In creating a legal black hole at 
Guantánamo Bay, the United States experimented with a similar instrumentalist 
attitude toward law.  One can only wonder if the abuses that occurred in such a 
place, lawless for only a relatively short time, were part of the effect or part of the 
cause of that instrumentalism. 
 By way of illustration, consider now the following rule -- Rule One for the 
Trial Judiciary -- and ask yourself whether it is a Russian or American rule.  It has 
been slightly redacted to obscure the answer: 
In the interests of justice, a … Judge may modify or 
change any Rule of Court or any portion thereof, or 
determine a certain Rule of Court or any portion 
thereof is not applicable to a given trial … . When 
taking such action, a … Judge will so advise 
counsel in the case, other interested parties, the 
Chief Trial Judge, and the trial judiciary staff.78 
Without context, it is hard to say.  That context is supplied by the metaphors of  
law that legal culture, indeed the society’s culture, supplies.  In our culture of 




these proceedings to modify or change the rules of court would be subjected to 
intense scrutiny.  This would come not only from the adversarial legal combatants 
themselves, but from observers from the bar, the news media, and many others.  
Indeed, my week spent observing the military commission proceedings in United 
States v. al-Nashiri focused on a motion to dismiss the charges because of 
unlawful influence over the commission proceedings by its convening authority 
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who sought to accelerate the proceedings by 
requiring the judge in the case to live at Guantánamo Bay, and accept no other 
judicial duties, until this particular commission had been brought to a 
conclusion.79  The motion was vigorously argued and resulted in a detailed, 
carefully reasoned order from the military judge, who granted the motion in part, 
ordering the disqualification of five government officials (the Convening 
Authority and his staff of legal advisors) from any future action in the case.80 
 But transplant the same rule from one system to another and its application 
“in the interests of justice” may vary dramatically.  Part of the reason, as this 
essay argues, is the slippery nature of legal analogies.  Their use may conflate 
different times or contexts, or reveal our weakness of will in the face of fear.  But 
use them, it seems, we must.  They are inescapable aspects of our legal 
imaginations that we are no more capable of isolating from law than our culture, 
society, and language. 
 The picture below, taken at Camp X-Ray by the author, shows the place 
where a now iconic image – of detainees squatting in orange jumpsuits, goggled 
and gagged to deprive them of their senses and their voice – is now rusting and 
overgrown with weeds.  The site has been preserved by court order, as potential 
evidence for lawsuits about torture.81  That torture occurred at Guantánamo Bay 
and elsewhere has now been confirmed.82  It was, after all, for al-Nashiri’s torture 
that Poland now must pay compensation, even as he remains detained at 
Guantánamo Bay watching his military commission creep along.  The United 
States has not yet been forced to pay compensation for torturing him, both in 
Poland and here.83 
 A picture such as this seems the right way to end an essay on the theme 
“Critical Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law.”  At the same time, this 
decrepit image reveals the depths to which a country can plunge away from its 
rule-of-law principles and the great difficulties their restoration may later require.  
“The past is another country,” but the United States today remains affected by a 
past in which “they do things differently.”  The lessons learned, if they are 
learned, provide a critical perspective of the first order: the rule of law is a fragile 
state of being that cannot be taken for granted.  No state is immune from the 






Picture taken by the author, Feb. 26, 2015, Camp X-Ray, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
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